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EMPLOYMENT LAW

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY COMMISSION DECISIONS:
STUNTED EFFORTS TO MINIMIZE LITIGATION

COSTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Shelton v. OscarMayer Foods Corp.' the Supreme Court of South Carolina
held that the judicially created doctrine of collateral estoppel should not be applied
to prevent the relitigation of issues previously decided in Employment Security
Commission (ESC) hearings. 2 In so holding, South Carolina joined the ranks of
numerous other jurisdictions that similarly refuse to extend a preclusive effect to
decisions made at unemployment compensation hearings.'
After briefly describing the doctrine of collateral estoppel, this Note examines
why South Carolina refused to extend a preclusive effect to ESC decisions. The
analysis continues by contrasting the arguments asserted by courts and
commentators concerning whether collateral estoppel should be applied to decisions
made at unemployment compensation hearings. The Note concludes by suggesting
that the rule in Shelton should be applied only in cases involving the use of
offensive collateral estoppel.
II. AN EXPLANATION OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a judicially created doctrine that
prevents the relitigation of issues previously decided between the same parties or
their privies.4 Because the doctrine is applied when a prior judicial tribunal has
resolved a fully litigated issue, litigants use collateral estoppel to obtain summary
judgment on that decided issue.' Collateral estoppel offers several advantages both

1. 325 S.C. 248, 481 S.E.2d 706 (1997).
2. Id. at 254, 481 S.E.2d at 709.
3. See id. at 253-54, 481 S.E.2d at 708-09 (citing Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188
(3d Cir. 1988); Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586 (D. Utah 1988); Salida Sch. Dist.
R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987) (en bane); Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400
(Ky. Ct. App. 1991); Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., 850 P.2d 996 (N.M. 1993); Case v. Lower
Saucon Township, 654 A.2d 57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)).
4. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
5. See, e.g., Bennettv. South CarolinaDep'tof Corrections, 305 S.C. 310,408 S.E.2d 230 (1991)
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to litigants and to thejudicial system. First, the doctrine promotesjudicial economy'
by saving the parties the expense of relitigating decided issues.7 Second, by
eliminating the possibility of a second judicial tribunal resolving the identical issue
differently, collateral estoppel encourages litigants to rely on the court system
because it provides for greater consistency in judicial decisions.' Finally, the
doctrine promotes comity throughout the United States judicial system because it
encourages federal and state courts to mutually recognize the validity of decisions
made in the other court system.9
Collateral estoppel may be used both defensively and offensively.'0 Defensive
collateral estoppel prevents aplaintfffromrelitigating an issue that the plaintiff lost
in a prior adjudication." Offensive collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of
issues that were decided against a defendant in an earlier proceeding. 2 To
demonstrate how collateral estoppel is applied, suppose that a husband and wife,
riding in one automobile, were involved in a car accident with another automobile.
Suppose further that the driver of the latter car was acting within the scope of his
employment at the time the accident occurred. Accordingly, privity authorizes either
the husband or wife or both to sue not only the employee/driver but also the
employee's employer as potential defendants. If the husband brought an action
exclusively against the driver of the other automobile and the court specifically
found that the defendant driver did not negligently cause the accident, defensive
collateral estoppel would preclude the husband from relitigating the issue of
negligence against the driver's employer. In this regard, defensive collateral
estoppel conserves judicial resources because it encourages plaintiffs to join all
potential defendants in the first lawsuit. 3 A loss against one defendant could
preclude the plaintifffrom subsequently litigating the issue and recovering damages
against another defendant in privity.
If instead, inthe husband's lawsuit against the defendant driver, the court found
that the driver negligently caused the accident, the driver would be precluded by
offensive collateral estoppel from relitigating the issue of his negligence in a suit
initiated by the wife. The wife could use offensive collateral estoppel to recover
damages from the defendant driver without relitigating the issue of the defendant's
negligence. Rather than conserving judicial resources, offensive collateral estoppel

(holding that summary judgment in favor of the State agency was appropriate because collateral
estoppel barred the aggrieved employee from relitigating decided issues).
6. ParklaneHosiery,439 U.S. at 326.
7. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-96 (1980).

8. Id.

9. Id. at 95-96.
10. ParklaneHosiery,439 U.S. at 329.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363,370,315 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 1984) (accepting
the application of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel).
13. Parklane Hosiery,439 U.S. at 329-30.
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encourages plaintiffs to initiate separate lawsuits.14 A plaintiff may be able to take
advantage of a prior judgment without being bound by the judgment if. the
defendant wins.'" In the car accident example, the wife, in a subsequent lawsuit,
would be able to profit from the husband's victory against the defendant. Had her
husband lost, she would not be bound by a decision against the husband. In other
words, if the defendant driver won the first suit against the husband, the defendant
driver would not be able to bind the wife to this decision because collateral estoppel
is only available when the party againstwhom it is being asserted was a party or
that party's privy in the prior adjudication.16 Because the husband and wife are not
in privity in this example, the wife may not be bound by a decision adverse to the
husband. The wife would benefit from initiating her own lawsuit because she may
be able to recover against the defendant driver either by taking advantage of her
husband's earlier victory or by relitigating the issue of the defendant's negligence.
Offensive collateral estoppel may be unfair to a defendant. 7 A defendant may
have had little incentive to fully litigate the issue in the initial action. 8 Again, using
the car accident example, suppose that the husband sustained only minor injuries

from the impact. Damages in his personal injury action may be valued at $5,000.
Suppose further that the wife had sustained severe bodily harm. Damages in her
personal injury action against the defendant driver may be valued at $50,000.
Clearly, the defendant would have a greater incentive to fully litigate the issue of
negligence in the second lawsuit when liability for damages is magnified ten-fold.
Thus, it would be unfair to bind a defendant to an earlier adverse judgment when
the defendant has greater incentives to allocate time, money, and resources to
litigating the second action. Moreover, it would also be unfair to bind a defendant
to an earlier decision when more advantageous procedural opportunities are
available in a later action.' 9 For example, section 28 in the Second Restatement of
Judgments notes that "the procedures available in the first court may have been
tailored to the prompt, inexpensive determination of small claims and thus may be
wholly inappropriate to the determination of the same issues when presented in the
context of a much larger claim. 20
Because the availability of offensive collateral estoppel does not encourage the
conservation of judicial resources and because its application may be unfair to a
defendant, the United States Supreme Court does not condone its liberal
application. The Court has opined that "[t]he general rule should be that in cases
where a plaintiff could easily have joined in the earlier action or where.., the
application of offensive estoppel would be unfair to a defendant, a trial judge should

14. Id. at 330.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 326.

17. Id. at 330.
18. Id.; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF JUDGMENTS § 28(5) (1982).

19. ParklaneHosiery, 439 U.S. at 330-31.
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28
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not allow the use of offensive collateral estoppel."2'
In United States v. Utah Construction & Mining Co.2 the Supreme Court
extended the doctrine of collateral estoppel to decisions of administrative
agencies.2 The Court ruled that administrative agency decisions may have a binding
effect if: (1) the agency acted in ajudicial capacity; (2) the agency resolved clearly
relevant factual disputes; (3) both parties had the opportunity to fully and fairly
argue their case; and (4) both parties had an opportunity to request the court to
review adverse findings.24 A determination of whether the administrative
proceeding provided both parties with a full and fair opportunity to litigate requires
consideration of the following factors: the nature of the prior judicial forum, the
significance of the initial claim, the incentive to litigate, the breadth of the litigation,
the competence ofcounsel, the extent of discovery, the differences in the applicable
law, and the likelihood that litigants will bring subsequent claims." In addition to
satisfying the Utah Construction& Miningtest, a party seeking preclusion through
an administrative determination must also establish the traditional elements of
collateral estoppel. Traditional collateral estoppel is only appropriate when: (1) the
identical issue was decided in the prior adjudication;26 (2) a determination of the
issue was necessary to arrive at the final judgment;27 and (3) the party against whom
the plea is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior
adjudication.28
III. SOUTH CAROLINA'S LIMITATIONS ON COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

Shelton v. OscarMayer Foods Corp. is a case of first impression in this state
in which the South Carolina Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether
collateral estoppel should apply to decisions of the Employment Security

Commission. 9 Though recognizing its previous application of collateral estoppel

21. ParklaneHosiery,439 U.S. at 331.
22. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
23. Id. at 421-23.
24. Id. at 422. The third element of the Utah Construction& Mining test is also required to
satisfy traditional collateral estoppel. See Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 588
(D. Utah 1988).
25. Ryan v. New York Tel. Co., 467 N.E.2d 487, 491 (N.Y. 1984). Cf. REsTATEMENT(SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 28, 29 (1982) (enumerating circumstances to consider in determining whether
relitigation should be permitted).
26. See Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363, 371, 315 S.E.2d 186, 191 (1984); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982) ("When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a
different claim.").
27. See Beall,281 S.C. at 371,315 S.E.2d at 191; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS

§ 27

(1982).
28. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
29. Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 481 S.E.2d 706 (1997).
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to administrative agency decisions, the court declined to extend the doctrine to ESC
decisions.3

These decisions are not a substitute for full and fair adjudication, and to extend
their preclusive effect would require a concomitant increase in procedural
protections and process. In Shelton the plaintiff was discharged from employment
at the Louis Rich processing plant in Newberry, South Carolina, after a security
guard advised management that Shelton was smoking marijuana in the company's
parking lot." Shelton subsequently sought to recover unemployment compensation
from the ESC. 2 The ESC hearing officer concluded that "Shelton was discharged
without cause and [therefore] entitled to benefits."33 The defendant employer did
not appeal the decision of the hearing officer.34 Shelton then initiated a civil action
against Louis Rich, listing breach of contract as one of his many claims. 5 Shelton
argued that the defendant failed to enforce the company's rules fairly and equally,
as required by the employee handbook. 6 He moved for partial summary judgment
on the basis of offensive collateral estoppel, seeking to preclude Louis Rich from
relitigating whether he had been discharged for smoking marijuana." The judge
denied this motion. 8 At trial, the judge granted the defendant's motion for a
directed verdict.39 The South Carolina Court of Appeals initially reversed the trial

court's decision on the collateral estoppel issue.4" However, in arehearing, the court
of appeals affirmed the lower court's determination, ruling that "Louis Rich should
not be collaterally estopped from relitigating issues decided in a previous ESC
hearing.""1 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court
of appeals, similarly refusing to extend preclusive effect to the factual findings of
the ESC.42

The supreme court reasoned that the application of collateral estoppel would
run counter to the purposes of the ESC.43 The ESC's procedures are purposely
minimized so that the commission can "quickly provide benefits to persons
becoming unemployed through no fault of their own."" The court suggested that
if ESC decisions were given preclusive effect, discharged employees would be
denied immediate relief because unemployment hearings would become forums for

30. Id. at 251-52, 481 S.E.2d at 707-08.

31. Id. at 250, 481 S.E.2d at 707.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Shelton, 325 S.C. at 250, 481 S.E.2d at 707.

36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Shelton, 325 S.C. at 250-51, 481 S.E.2d at 707.
42. Id. at 251, 481 S.E.2d at 707.
43. Id. at 252, 481 S.E.2d at 708.
44. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-27-20 (Law. Co-op. 1986)).
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

5

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 9

1156

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1151

"lengthy civil litigation."45 Additionally, the court stated that it would be unfair to
apply collateral estoppel to ESC findings.46 First, employers often have little
incentive to fully litigate the issue of an employee's discharge at unemployment
compensation hearings. 47 Employer liability for unemployment compensation is
small relative to damages available in a civil suit for wrongful discharge.4" Second,
the court opined that underrepresented employees could "unknowingly forfeit an
opportunity to litigate significant issues in a subsequent civil action" if offensive
collateral estoppel applied.49 The court concluded its analysis by citing persuasive
authority from other jurisdictions that have similarly refused to apply collateral
estoppel to factual findings of unemployment proceedings. 0
IV. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL INTHE EMPLOYMENT CONTEXT
Collateral estoppel is an attractive judicial device because it eliminates
duplicative trial work and enables litigants to rely on the judgment of a given issue.

Assertions of collateral estoppel often appear in the employment context.'
Specifically, terminated employees that have been compensated by an
unemployment commission frequently assert the doctrine in subsequent litigation
seeking to take advantage of the commission's earlier factual findings.52 This
pattern is particularly true when subsequent claims are premised upon the breach
of an employment contract. 53 Unemployment compensation statutes generally

45. Id.
46. See id. at 253, 481 S.E.2d at 708.
47. Shelton, 325 S.C. at 253, 481 S.E.2d at 708.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 253-54, 481 S.E.2d at 708-09 (citing Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188
(3d Cir. 1988); Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586 (D. Utah 1988); Salida Sch. Dist.
R-32-J v. Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1991); Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., 850 P.2d 996 (N.M. 1993); Case v.Lower Saucon
Township, 654 A.2d 57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995)).
51. See, e.g., Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1189 (alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Salt Creck
Freightways v. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435, 435 (Wyo. 1979)
(alleging religious discrimination).
52. See, e.g., Shelton, 325 S.C. at254, 481 S.E.2d at709 (holding that an employee compensated
by the ESC may not collaterally estop the employer from contesting liability in a subsequent wrongful
discharge suit).
53. Caras,688 F. Supp. at 587. Collateral estoppel is also asserted when subsequent proceedings
include allegations of discrimination. See, e.g., Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1189-90 (discussing an employee's
allegations of discrimination in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Ross v. Communications Satellite
Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 356-57 (4th Cir. 1985) (deciding whether collateral estoppel precludes the
litigation ofcharges brought underTitle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Caras,688 F. Supp. 58890 (reviewing allegations of employment discrimination, age discrimination, and sex discrimination);
Colorado Springs Coach Co. v. State Civil Rights Comm'n, 536 P.2d 837 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975)
(discussing charges of racial discrimination), overruledby Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732
P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987). The Supreme Court in UniversityofTennessee v. Elliott,478 U.S. 788 (1986),
held that unreviewed administrative agency findings may not be given preclusive effect if the
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provide that for a terminated employee to receive benefits, the hearing officer must
determine that the employee was discharged "through no fault of his own."54 If the
employment contract provides that an employee may be discharged only for just
cause, an administrative finding of"no fault" is arguably dispositive of a breach of
contract issue. The employer could not have just cause for the employee's
termination if the employee did not engage in misconduct. The question of whether
collateral estoppel should apply to unemployment compensation decisions has been
addressed in numerous jurisdictions." While valid arguments support collateral
estoppel in the employment context, the majority of courts, commentators, and state
legislatures support the trend towards a black letter law opposing the use of
collateral estoppel."
A. Arguments Opposing CollateralEstoppel
Those opposed to collateral estoppel focus on issues of policy and fairness in
rejecting its application. First, opponents argue that the application of collateral
estoppel would adversely affect the unemployment compensation system.58 As
noted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, unemployment compensation hearings
are purposely designed to incorporate informal, non-technical procedures so the

subsequent claim is based upon Title VII violations. Id. at 796. Thus, regardless of the nature of the
unemployment compensation hearing, decisions that are not appealed to either state or federal court
may not preclude subsequent litigation because "Congress has guaranteed a federal forum in Title VII
cases." Caras,688 F. Supp. at 589. In 1991, the United States Supreme Court extended this logic to
cases brought under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan
Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-110(5) (Law. Co-op. 1986); accord GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8194(2)(A) (1992) (providing that an individual is not qualified for benefits without "becom[ing]
unemployed through no fault on the part of the individual"); see also ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.406(h)
(Michie 1996) (providing that a claimant is ineligible to receive extended unemploymentbenefits if that
employee was "discharged for misconduct"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 443.111(6)(c)1.b (West 1997)

(disqualifying an individual who has been "discharged from work for misconduct").
55. See Kelley, 860 F.2d at 1189; Caras, 688 F. Supp. at 588; Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J. v.
Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160 (Colo. 1987); Gray, 806 S.W.2d at 401; Weilerv. New Century Bank, 423
N.W.2d 664 (Mich. Ct. App.), vacated, 432 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 1988); Shovelin, 850 P.2d at 998;
Dusovic v. New Jersey Transit Bus Operations, Inc., 508 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1986); Case, 654
A.2d at 60.
56. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
57. In United States v. Utah Construction& Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966), the Supreme
Court held that decisions of administrative agencies may only be given preclusive effect if both parties
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate. Id. at 422. While opponents of collateral estoppel argue that
preclusion is inappropriate, their arguments are not meant to imply that judges should not consider the
evidence presented at the earlier proceedings in formulating their own decisions. See Ross, 759 F.2d
at 363.
58. See, e.g., Shovelin, 850 P.2d at 1004 (noting that the application of collateral estoppel would
undermine legislative intent because unemployed workers may elect to forego compensation "to
preserve their right to seek further civil redress," or the compensation hearings may become "full blown
trials" hampering the expeditious nature of obtaining unemployment benefits).
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unemployed have access to funds at early stages of unemployment.5 9 Preclusion

would thwart this legislative objective. Employers would have a strong incentive to
contest claims for unemployment compensation because of the risk of subsequent
preclusion.' A prevailing employer could use the administrative finding of fault
offensively to prevent the employee from relitigating this determination.6 ' As a

result, the hearings could become lengthy trials.62
Moreover, if employers chose not to participate in the unemployment hearings
to avoid the possibility of subsequent issue preclusion, the legislative intent behind
the unemployment compensation system would be frustrated.63 Employers may
reason that because default judgments are not given preclusive effect,' employees
that are compensated by default would not be able to subsequently estop the
employer from litigating issues pertaining to the employee's termination.65
However, compensation by default runs contrary to the objective of the
unemployment compensation system. The system is designed to assist discharged
employees who are rightfullyentitledto benefits.' Only those employees that have
been terminated through no fault of their own qualify for compensation.6 7
Employees receiving compensation by default could potentially fail this statutory
requirement. Similarly, employees, often lacking adequate representation at
compensation proceedings, may choose to forego benefits because a loss at the
compensation proceeding could preclude subsequent civil litigation.68 By sacrificing

59. Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods, Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 253, 481 S.E.2d 706, 708 (1997).
60. See, e.g.,
Morrison,732 P.2d at 1165 ("[The employerwould have a strong incentive to use
its superior resources consistently to oppose a discharged employee's claim for unemployment
benefits.").
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400,403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).
64. See In re Gottheiner, 703 F.2d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1983); Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Illinois Tool
Works, Inc. 694 F.2d 466,469 (7th Cir. 1982); Spilman v. Harley, 656 F.2d 224,228 (6th Cir. 1981);
Massachusetts v. Hale, 618 F.2d 143,146 (lstCir. 1980);In re McMillan, 579 F.2d 289,293 (3d Cir.
1978).
65. Willard Z. Carr, Jr., The Preclusive Effect of Unemployment Decisions in Subsequent
Litigation,4 LAB. LAw. 69,72 (1988).
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., S.C. CODEANN. § 41-35-120(2) (Law. Co-op. 1986) (disqualifying claimants from
receiving unemployment compensation upon a showing that they were "discharged for cause connected
with [their] most recent work").
68. Terminated employees are not required to apply for unemployment compensation. See S.C.
CODE ANN. § 41-35-110 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (providing that unemployed workers "shall be eligible
to receive benefits" if they meet the statutory criteria, but not mandating that they exhaust their
administrative remedies). Employees are free to initiate separate civil proceedings instead of seeking
administrative relief. But cf.S.C. CODE ANN. § 8-17-330 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (requiring state
employees to exhaust their administrative remedies by first bringing their complaint before the state
employee grievance committee);'Allen v. South Carolina Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm'n, 321
S.C. 188, 195,467 S.E.2d 450, 454 (Ct. App. 1996) (holding that adischarged employee must exhaust
administrative remedies before the State Employee Grievance Committee prior to initiating a claim for
damages under the Whistleblower Act).
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their right to unemployment benefits, employees would preserve their right to seek
civil damages.69 However, this also runs contrary to the legislative goal of quickly
providing benefits to those in need.70
Second, opponents argue that the application of collateral estoppel to
unemployment compensation decisions is inappropriate because the two tribunals
do not decide identical issues.7' Unemployment hearings determine only whether
an employee satisfies the statutory requirements to qualify for compensation.72 In
South Carolina, this determination requires that the unemployed insured worker:
(1) filed a claim for benefits; (2) registered for work; (3) is able and available to
work; (4) has been unemployed for a waiting period of one week; and (5) "is
73
separated, through no fault of his own, from his most recent bona fide employer."
While a factual finding of an employee's "fault" or "misconduct" appears relevant
to allegations premised upon the breach of an employment contract, the standards
of cause used in an unemployment hearing and a breach of contract case have an
important difference. The District Court of South Carolina recognized this
distinction and noted:
At the hearing before the Commission, the [defendants were] required to
demonstrate that the plaintiff was nonrenewed [or discharged] for reasons
of "willful misconduct" in order to establish a disqualification. Defendants
might very well have been unable to satisfy this standard and yet have
terminated the plaintiff for valid and justifiable reasons. The "just cause"
type reasons necessary for a decision to nonrenew [or discharge] may exist
without the employer being able to satisfy the severe standard required by
the unemployment law.74

69. Shovelin v. Central N.M. Elec. Coop., 850 P.2d 996, 1004 (N.M. 1993).
70. Id.; cf. SOUTHCAROLINAEMPLOYMENTSECURITY CoMMIsSIoN, EMPLOYER HANDBOOK ON
THE SOUTH CAROLINA EMPLOYMENT SECURITY LAW 1, 1 (1995) (noting that unemployment
compensation is designed to "lighten the burden of economic hardship... [,] stabilize purchasing
power L] and ... [l]essen the need for public relief and charity").
71. See Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 1188, 1195-96 (3d Cir. 1988); Caras v. Family
First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586, 589 (D. Utah 1988); Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v. Morrison, 732

P.2d 1160, 1166 (Colo. 1987); Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400,402-03 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991);
Case v. Lower Saucon Township, 654 A.2d 57, 60 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995). But see Weiler v. New
Century Bank, 423 N.W.2d 664,667 (Mich. Ct. App.) (stating that collateral estoppel was appropriate

for subsequent claims based upon breach of contract, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress because the employment security commission duly considered these issues when it refused to
grant benefits to the claimant), vacated,432 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 1988).
72. Gray, 806 S.W.2d at 402; see also S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-35-120 (Law. Co-op. 1986)
(establishing the parameters for disqualification: "(1) Leaving work voluntarily... (2) [d]ischarge for
cause connected with the employment... (3) [flailure to accept work... (4) [involvement in a] Labor
dispute... (5) [rleceiving benefits elsewhere... (6) [v]oluntary retirement").
73. S.C. CODEANN. § 41-35-110 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
74. Moore v. Bonner, 526 F. Supp. 143, 150 (D.S.C. 1981), rev'd on othergrounds, 695 F.2d
799 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Also, in Teamsters Local Union No. 273 v. CSX Beckett Aviation, Inc." the
Western District of Pennsylvania held that a finding of the state unemployment
compensation board could not operate to estop the employer from relitigating the
issue of whether the employee was terminated for "just cause" as required by the
collective bargaining agreement.76 The court noted that an unemployment
proceeding should not be given preclusive effect because an employee awarded
benefits due to a lack of "willful misconduct" may still have been discharged for

"just cause."" In other words,

'"[a]n employee

may be terminated for cause that

does not rise to the level of misconduct disqualifying him from unemployment
benefits."' 78 Thus, it would be unfair to bind the employer to an adverse decision
on the issue of employee misconduct when the employer would be able to establish
that the employee was discharged for just cause. The Second Restatement of
Judgments accepts this argument and asserts that collateral estoppel is inappropriate
when the party sought to be precluded has "a significantly heavier burden of
persuasion with respect to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent
action."79
Also, other issues pertinent to the employee's subsequent claim may not have
been litigated at the unemployment proceeding. For example, in determining
whether employees were discharged through their own fault, hearing officers rarely
consider whether an employee's race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, or
age played a role in the discharge." Primarily, substantial differences between
unemployment compensation and civil rights statutes separate these specific facts.
Unemployment compensation statutes focus on the forbidden conduct of the
employee, whereas civil rights statutes target the forbidden motive of the
employer.8'
Third, opponents argue that collateral estoppel is inappropriate in the
employment context82 because "the burden [of persuasion] has shifted to [the]
adversary." 83 At unemployment hearings, the employer bears the burden of proving
that the employee was discharged due to misconduct or fault." Yet, if the employee
brings a subsequent civil action against the employer, the burden of proof shifts
75. 687 F. Supp. 985 (W.D. Pa. 1988).
76. Id. at 987.

77. Id.
78. Bernstein v. Birch Wathen Sch., 421 N.Y.S.2d 574, 576 (App. Div. 1979) (quoting Silberman
v. Penn Gen. Agencies ofN.Y., Inc., 406 N.Y.S.2d 93,94 (App. Div. 1978)); see also James v. Levine,
315 N.E.2d 471,475 (N.Y. 1974) ("Causes for discharge which do not attain the level of misconduct
may not be used to render claimants ineligible for benefits.").
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
80. See Kelley v. TYK Refractories Co., 860 F.2d 11.88, 1195 (3d Cir. 1988) (concluding that
Pennsylvania's unemployment compensation law and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 promote different public
policies and so issue preclusion was inappropriate).
81. Ross v. Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 362 (4th Cir. 1985).
82. See Carr,supranote 65, at 76.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(4) (1982).
84. See Carr,supranote 65, at 76.
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from the employer to the employee." Opponents argue that it is unfair to prohibit
an employer from contesting liability in a subsequent civil suit when the burden of
proof has shifted.8" In particular, this is evident when the employee brings a
subsequent claim alleging breach of contract. Clearly, the application of collateral
estoppel would be unfair to an employer who barely fails to prove the employee's
misconduct at the unemployment hearing, but whose evidence would have

established a prima facie case ofjust cause for the termination." Collateral estoppel
would enable employees to establish the absence ofjust cause in contract claims
even though their own evidence would fail to prove this essential element.

Fourth, opponents of collateral estoppel in the employment context argue that
employers often have little incentive to participate fully in the unemployment
compensation hearings.88 Frequently, the amount in controversy in a civil action
greatly exceeds liability for unemployment compensation.8 9 The Second
Restatement of Judgments provides that collateral estoppel "would be plainly
unfair" when the amount in controversy in the first action is small relative to that
recoverable in the second proceeding. 9'
Finally, opponents have noted the procedural differences between
unemployment hearings and civil trials.9 Civil trials typically have formal rules of
evidence, full discovery, adequate time for witnesses to testify, a judge with a law
degree, and the right to a trial by jury.' In contrast, unemployment proceedings
often have relaxed rules of evidence, limited discovery, and minimal opportunities
for trial preparation.93 Opponents of collateral estoppel argue that it would be unfair
to multiply the consequences of a judgment when the record has not been fully
developed.9 4
These arguments against the application of collateral estoppel to decisions made

85. Id.

86. See id.
87. See id.
88. See id. at 74-75; Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400, 403 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).
89. See, e.g., Hicks v. Quaker Oats Co., 662 F.2d 1158, 1171 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting the
unfairness of binding the defendant to the unemployment compensation board's decision when the
amount at stake in the board hearing was $35,000, but the plaintiffs stood to collect over $400,000 on
the current judgment). If an employee is found eligible for compensation in South Carolina, there is no
immediate monetary effect on the employer. Rather, the employer's contribution rating is minimally
increased the following year. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-31-20 to -50 (Law. Co-op. 1986 & Supp.
1997).
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28 cmt.j (1982).
91. See Caras v. Family First Credit Union, 688 F. Supp. 586,589-90 (D. Utah 1988); Gray, 806
S.W.2d at 403; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28(3) (1982) ("A new
determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or extensiveness ofthe procedures
followed in the two courts.").
92. See, e.g., S.C. R. Civ. P. 26 (discovery); S.C. R. Civ. P. 38 (jury trial); S.C. R. EVID.
93. Caras,688 F. Supp. at 589-90; Gray,806 S.W.2d at 403.
94. See, e.g., Caras,688 F. Supp. at 589-90 (noting that the doctrine of collateral estoppel should
not apply because in the preparation for the administrative hearing the parties did not conduct discovery
on the plaintiff's discrimination and breach of contract claims).
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at unemployment compensation proceedings and the almost uniform judicial
rejection ofthe doctrine inthis areahave prompted several state legislatures to enact
statutes specifically proscribing its application in this context.95 These laws
generally provide that findings of fact or law made with respect to unemployment
compensation proceedings are neither conclusive nor binding in subsequent
proceedings, even if the same parties and the same facts are involved. 96
B. Arguments FavoringCollateralEstoppel
Not all courts and commentators agree that the application of collateral estoppel
is inappropriate in the employment contextY Some courts have found that
unemployment proceedings should be given preclusive effect because both tribunals
examine identical issues. For example, in Salt CreekFreightwaysv. Wyoming Fair
Employment PracticesCommission' the Wyoming Supreme Court held that an
employee who was denied benefits at an unemployment compensation hearing
should be barred from relitigating the issue of alleged religious discrimination
before the Fair Employment Practices Commission." The court reasoned that both
agencies would be asked to determine the same issue (i.e., the reason behind the
employee's termination) based upon the same set of facts."° In Ryan v. New York
Telephone Co.' the New York Court of Appeals reasoned that identical issues
would be addressed by both the unemployment compensation tribunal and the civil
court. 2 The administrative law judge in that case specifically found that the

discharged employee did not qualify for unemployment benefits because the
employee "was guilty of unauthorized removal and possession of company
property, and that he was discharged for that reason.""' 3 The court conclu'ded that
this finding was dispositive ofthe employee's subsequent allegations of false arrest,
95. ALAsKA STAT. § 23.20.497 (Michie 1996); ARK.CODE ANN. § 11-10-314(f)(2) (Michie
1996); CAL. UNEmp. INs. CODE § 1960 (West Supp. 1997); COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-74-108 (1997);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 31-249g(b) (West Supp. 1997); IDAHOCODE § 72-1368(k)(2) (Supp. 1997);
KY.REv. STAT.ANN. §341.420(5) (Michie 1995); LA.REv. STAT.ANN. § 23:1636 (Vest Supp. 1997);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1194(12) (West Supp. 1996);N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §282-A:180(Supp.
.1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 51-1-55 (Michie Supp. 1993); OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.28(S)
(Anderson 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-7-304(k) (Supp. 1997).
96. Statutes denying preclusive effect to factual findings ofunemployment compensation boards
operate to diminish the precedential value of judicial opinions. See Salida Sch. Dist. R-32-J v.
Morrison, 732 P.2d 1160, 1164 n.4 (Colo. 1987). But cf.Cortright v. Premix, Inc., No. 90-A-1531,
1991 WL 132189, at*2-3 (Ohio Ct.App. July 19,1991) (unpublished opinion) (refusing to assign error
to the trial court's application of collateral estoppel in spite of a statutory provision that prohibits its
extension to decisions of the unemployment compensation board).
97. See Carr, supra note 65, at 79-8 1.
98. 598 P.2d 435 (Wyo. 1979).
99. Id. at 440.
100. Id. at 438-39.
101. 467 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 1984).
102. Id. at 490-91.
103. Id. at491.
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malicious prosecution, and wrongful discharge.'4 Specifically, the court determined
that the lack of a legal justification, an essential element of false arrest, was refuted
by the finding that the employee engaged in criminally chargeable misconduct."5
Also, the administrative ruling that the criminal charges were justified established
probable cause for the employer to institute criminal proceedings and thus disposed
of the employee's claim for malicious prosecution."'° Furthermore, the court held
that the issue of wrongful discharge was previously decided because the
administrative judge found that the employee's conduct justified the discharge.0 7
In Weiler v. New Century Bank' 8 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
collateral estoppel should be applied to decisions of the Michigan Employment
Security Commission because a finding that the plaintiff left herjob voluntarily was
dispositive on the issue of wrongful discharge.0 9 However, this decision must be
limited to its facts.
In addition to maintaining that both the administrative and civil tribunals
examine identical issues, proponents of collateral estoppel argue that unemployment
hearings provide litigants with a full and fair opportunity to present their claims."
Although unemployment proceedings are often informal, litigants are afforded the
opportunity to be represented by counsel, to give testimony, to present witnesses,
and to have access to limited discovery.' Furthermore, both parties have a statutory
right to appeal these decisions."' The right to appeal provides litigants with
additional time and ensures that issues are fully and fairly litigated.
Furthermore, absent any preclusive effect, a court reviewing both decisions
may be obliged to affirm inconsistent results." 3 For example, a reviewing court
could affirm a decision of the employment security commission finding an
employee ineligible for benefits because of misconduct and also affirm a decision
ofthe state employee grievance committee holding thatthe state employee's alleged
misconduct was merely a pretext for the employer's discriminatory motive.
Therefore, although the reviewing court would agree that the employee engaged in
misconduct, the court's decision would entitle the employee to recover for wrongful
discharge. This inconsistency, one of the anomalies that collateral estoppel is

104. Id. at 491-92.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 492.
107. Ryan, 467 N.E.2d at 492.
108. 423 N.W.2d 664 (Ct. App.), vacated,432 N.W.2d 172 (Mich. 1988).
109. Id. at 667-68.
110. See Carr, supranote 65, at 80.
111. See, e.g., Ryan, 467 N.E.2d at 492 (finding that "[the plaintiff] did, in fact, litigate the issue,
testifying himself and cross-examining defendants' witness through his union representative").
112. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 41-35-660 to -750 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (providing appellate
procedures). In South Carolina, an employee's claim for benefits is first determined by the state
examiner. The employee or employer may appeal this determination to the ESC and then to the courts
of South Carolina. Id.
113. Umberfield v. School Dist. No. 11, 522 P.2d 730, 734 (Colo. 1974).
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designed to eliminate," 4 may cause litigants to lose faith inthe judicial system.
Proponents of collateral estoppel criticize the argument that litigants have little
incentive to litigate in the first proceeding because the argument is based on circular
logic." 5 If both parties know that the unemployment proceeding will have a
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation, both clearly will have an incentive to fully
litigate.' 6 Furthermore, the burden of proof might not shift in the subsequent
proceeding." 7 An employer who bears the burden of proving misconduct at the
unemployment proceeding would continue to bear this burden if the employer
initiated the subsequent civil proceeding."' For example, if after the employee's
termination and compensation hearing, the employer brought an action against the
discharged employee for the conversion of company property, the burden of proof
would not switch from the employer to the employee. Finally, some courts hold that
a litigant who does not appeal administrative decisions should be barred from
subsequently relitigating the factual findings in civil court." 9 These courts justify
preclusion by applying a general rule that unappealed orders are binding on all
parties without regard to the prior forum. 2
V. SHELTON V OSCAR MAYER FOODSCORP.: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

As evidenced by the holding in Shelton, the South Carolina Supreme Court
found the arguments opposing the application of collateral estoppel persuasive.' 2'
But what effect will the Shelton decision have on subsequent litigation in South
Carolina? Should the holding be limited exclusively to assertions of offensive
collateral estoppel (at issue in the Shelton case), or should it similarly apply to
defensive collateral estoppel? In other words, should the courts of South Carolina
also refuse to apply collateral estoppel if an employer asserts it defensively after the
ESC denied the employee's claim for compensation? If the holding in Shelton is
interpreted as rejecting both forms of collateral estoppel, should the South Carolina
General Assembly take the next step and statutorily abrogate the doctrine
completely in the employment context?
A literal reading of the court's opinion suggests that the court completely

114. See Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363, 370, 315 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 1984).
115. See Carr,supranote 65, at 80.

116. Id. However, this argument appears to run contrary to the legislative objective of providing
prompt relief to employees discharged through no fault of their own.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Stall v. Bourne, 774 F.2d 657, 663 (4th Cir. 1985) (construing South Carolina law as

allowing collateral estoppel to operate when an earlier decision is not appealed); see also Salt Creek
Freightwaysv. Wyoming Fair Employment Practices Comm'n, 598 P.2d 435,440 (Wyo. 1979) ("[I]he
decision of the E.S.C. became conclusive when [the former employee] failed to appeal.").
120. See Stall, 774 F.2d at 663-64.
121. See Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 252-54, 481 S.E.2d 706, 708-09
(1997).
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rejected both offensive and defensive collateral estoppel as it pertains to ESC

decisions."Z Evidence that the court rejected both offensive and defensive collateral
estoppel is found in the following language: "[E]mployees are often unrepresented
in ESC hearings. If collateral estoppel applied, an unwary employee could
unknowingly forfeit an opportunity to litigate significant issues in a subsequent civil
action."'" Collateral estoppel only operates to preclude parties from relitigating
decided issues when they had a full and fair opportunity to litigate and lost in the
prior proceeding. 24 Therefore, employees "unknowingly forfeit[ing] an opportunity
to litigate"'" must have been denied compensation at the ESC hearing in order for
collateral estoppel to operate against them. As such, the court's statement has two
reasonable interpretations. One reading implies that an employer should not be able
to take advantage of offensive collateral estoppel in a subsequent suit against the
employee when the employee was previously denied compensation benefits. For
example, a finding that the employee was at fault should not offensively preclude
the employee from defending an action subsequently brought by the employer. The
other reading of this statement implies that collateral estoppel should not be applied
defensively. An employer should not be able to assert defensive collateral estoppel
to preclude an employee from bringing subsequent civil claims against the employer
when it was previously determined that the employee was at fault and ineligible for
benefits.
If, indeed, the court intended to completely abrogate the application of
collateral estoppel in the unemployment compensation context, it did so rejecting
the logic that was applied in prior decisions involving different administrative
agencies.' 26 The South Carolina General Assembly may now consider enacting a
statute that specifically proscribes the application of collateral estoppel in
employment proceedings. 27 A statute to this effect would provide greater
122. Id. at 254, 481 S.E.2d at 709 ("[Flindings of fact made during an ESC hearing will not be
given preclusive effect in any subsequent litigation between the employer and employee.").
123. Id. at 253, 481 S.E.2d at 708.
124. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329 (1979).
125. Shelton, 325 S.C. at 253, 481 S.E.2d at 708.
126. Perry v. State Law Enforcement Div., 310 S.C. 558, 426 S.E.2d 334 (Ct. App. 1992). In
Perry the court held that the State Law Enforcement Division's decision to uphold an employee's
discharge should be given preclusive effect in a subsequent breach of contract action. Id. at 561,426
S.E.2d at 336. The court reasoned that "[tjhe two actions arise out of the same facts, and they seek
adjudication that [the employee's] discharge was unwarranted." Id. Furthermore, "the same rights and
defenses [would be] available" to the aggrieved employee in both actions. Id.; see also Stall v. Bourne,
774 F.2d 657 (4th Cir. 1985) (construing South Carolina law as requiring the application of collateral
estoppel when the ESC denied benefits and the employee subsequently initiated a suit alleging
constitutional violations); Bennett v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 305 S.C. 310, 408 S.E.2d
230 (1991) (holding that an employee was precluded from asserting claims of retaliatory discharge
when the employee fully litigated the issue before the State Employee Grievance Committee); Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 284 S.C. 234,325 S.E.2d 566 (Ct. App. 1985) (barring
the relitigation of an alleged sham defense when a prior worker's compensation proceeding established
that the defense was valid).
127. For example, in 1991, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky held that collateral estoppel may
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consistency in the application of collateral estoppel.'
While in certain circumstances the state unemployment board does not resolve
the same issues that are involved in a subsequent proceeding and the expedient
nature of the proceeding may deny litigants a full and fair opportunity to litigate,
this is not necessarily true for all unemployment proceedings and for all issues.
General legislative orjudicial prohibitions against the application of both offensive
and defensive collateral estoppel are unreasonably excessive. Rather than
universally abrogating collateral estoppel in the unemployment compensation
context, a more appropriate approach may be either to continue addressing the issue
on a case-by-case basis, giving due regard to whether estoppel is being asserted
defensively or offensively, or to legislatively abrogate only the application of
offensive collateral estoppel.
Although United States Supreme Court decisions are not binding on the states
in this context,' 29 the Court's logic merits consideration. In United States v. Utah
Construction& Mining Co. 30 the Court held that an extension of collateral estoppel

to administrative agency decisions is appropriate if the judicial agency properly
resolved issues of fact and provided the parties with "an adequate opportunity to
litigate.'' As such, preclusion would conserve judicial resources because "[tihere
32
is . . . neither need nor justification for a second evidentiary hearing."'
Subsequently, the Supreme Court decided ParklaneHosiery Co. v. Shore.33 In
ParklaneHosierytheCourt distinguished between offensive collateral estoppel and
defensive collateral estoppel. 34 In discussingthe differences between the two forms
of preclusion, the Court stated that "the two situations should be treated

not be used in a subsequent civil trial to preclude the relitigation of factual findings entered at an
unemployment compensation hearing. Board of Educ. v. Gray, 806 S.W.2d 400 (Ky. Ct. App. 1991).
In 1992, the Kentucky legislature codified this holding. See Ky.Rav. STAT. ANN. § 341.420(5) (Michie
1995).
Statutes in abrogation of collateral estoppel seem to represent legislative recognition of the
inherent unfairness of unemployment compensation hearings. Would it be more appropriate for
legislatures to statutorily correct this unfairness rather than deprive litigants of the judicially created
doctrine?
128. See Noyes v. Channel Products, Inc., 935 F.2d 806, 809 n.1 (6th Cir. 1991) (noting that but
for the prohibition against retroactive application of legislative initiatives, the Ohio statute uniformly
abrogating the application ofcollateral estoppel would resolve the dispute). Butsee Cortright v. Premix,
Inc., No. 90-A-1531, 1991 WL 132189, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. July 19, 1991) (unpublished opinion)
(stating that the trial court's application of collateral estoppel did not constitute reversible error in spite
of the Ohio statute prohibiting its use).
129. See Beall v. Doe, 281 S.C. 363, 369-70, 315 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
although the United States Supreme Court has approved of nonmutual offensive collateral estoppel,
state courts are split on whether the doctrine should be applied).
130. 384 U.S. 394 (1966).
131. Id. at 422.
132. Id.
133. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
134. Id. at 329-31.
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differently."' 35 Presumably, offensive collateral estoppel drains judicial resources
and implicates issues of unfairness.'36
State courts have also distinguished between offensive and defensive collateral
estoppel. In Bernstein v. Birch Wathen School'37 a New York appellate court
properly distinguished the various applications of the doctrine and indicated that
cases involving offensive collateral estoppel should not control cases involving
defensive collateral estoppel. 3 Specifically, the court suggested that adifferent rule
applies when an employee is granted unemployment benefits, as opposed to when
the employee is found ineligible.' If the unemployment board compensates the
claimant, the employee should not be able to collaterally estop the employer from
litigating the issue of termination in a subsequent wrongful discharge suit. The court
noted that "other valid reasons may have justified [the employee's] discharge." 4 '
However, if the claimant is found ineligible for benefits, either due to "voluntary
termination without good cause" or due to "misconduct," this finding is dispositive
of wrongful discharge allegations.' Relitigating the issue of an employee's
wrongful discharge wastes judicial resources because another tribunal has already
determined that the employee either the job quit or engaged in misconduct. In
Bernstein the court ultimately held that collateral estoppel was appropriately
applied. 4 2
In Dusovic v. New Jersey TransitBus Operations,Inc."' another New York
appellate court also recognized the distinction between the two forms ofestoppel.'"
The court held that a compensated employee may not apply collateral estoppel
offensively to preclude the defendant employer from challenging liability in the
employee's subsequent breach of contract claim. 45 In doing so, the court
distinguished Ryan v. New York Telephone Co.'46 In Ryan, a case involving the
application of defensive collateral estoppel, 47 the defendant telephone company
asserted collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense to the plaintiff's subsequent

135. Id. at 329. In a footnote, the Court listed numerous commentators who "have expressed

reservations" pertaining to offensive collateral estoppel. Id.at 329 n.1 1; see Brainerd Currie, Mutuality
of CollateralEstoppel:Limits ofthe BernhardDoctrine,9 STAN.L.REv. 281 (1957); Herbert Semmel,
CollateralEstoppel, Mutuality and Joinderof Parties,68 COLUM. L. REv. 1457 (1968).
136. See ParklaneHosiery,439 U.S. at 329-30.

137. 421 N.Y.S.2d 574 (App. Div. 1979).
138. Id. at 576-77.
139. See id. (distinguishing cases thathold collateral estoppel inapplicable because the discharged

employee was awarded unemployment compensation).
140. Id. at 576.
141. See id. at 576-77.
142. Id. at 578.
143. 508 N.Y.S.2d 26 (App. Div. 1986).
144. See id. at 28.
145. Id.
146. 467 N.E.2d 487 (N.Y. 1984).
147. Id. at 489.
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breach of contract claim.'48 In an earlier proceeding before an administrative law

judge, the plaintiffwas denied unemployment benefits because "[the employee] lost
his employment due to misconduct."14 9 Reversing the lower court, the New York
Court of Appeals found that the requisite criteria for collateral estoppel had been
satisfied and that the doctrine should be applied.5 0 The Dusovic court, in
distinguishing Ryan, suggested that fairness issues were not implicated in Ryan
because the plaintiff "had initiated the prior administrative proceeding and had a
clear incentive and did litigate thoroughly the issue of his discharge."','
Bernstein,Dusovic, andRyan demonstrate that the arguments against collateral
estoppel are clearly not as persuasive when the doctrine is asserted defensively. If
an employer is able to satisfy its heightened burden of proving employee
"misconduct" and a claimant is denied benefits, the employer should be able to
assert collateral estoppel defensively in a subsequent proceeding that resolves the
same issues. Unlike the application of offensive collateral estoppel, the defensive
use of the doctrine does not implicate the same matters of fairness. Claimants that
initiate unemployment hearings generally have an incentive to litigate because it is
their right to compensation that is at stake. Employers, on the other hand, may not
have a comparable incentive to fully litigate because the amount in controversy is
often negligible. If an employment compensation board finds that an employer, who
has used minimal resources, has satisfied the heightened burden of proving either
employee misconduct or voluntary termination, judicial resources would be wasted
if the employee were to relitigate the same issue in a subsequent proceeding when
the burden of proof has shifted to the employee. Furthermore, the application of
defensive collateral estoppel is fair because claimants found ineligible for benefits
generally have a statutory right to appeal to a higher tribunal.5 2 Because this
statutory right normally includes judicial review,' claimants are protected from
possible procedural unfairness.
VI. CONCLUSION

The language of the Shelton decision seems very clear. Collateral estoppel
should not be applied to prevent the relitigation of issues already decided by the
ESC.'54 However, such a broad prohibition is unnecessarily excessive because it
restricts the application of both offensive and defensive collateral estoppel.
Although the two doctrines are conceptually related, they have different

148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at493.
151. Dusovic, 508 N.Y.S.2d at 28.
152. See, e.g., S.C. CODEANN. § 41-35-740 (Law. Co-op. 1982) (providing thatjudicial review

is available to aggrieved parties after they have exhausted their administrative remedies).
153. Id.
154. Shelton v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 325 S.C. 248, 254, 481 S.E.2d 706, 709 (1997).
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applications and consequences. The underlying rationales used by the supreme court
inShelton apply more readily to offensive, rather than defensive, collateral estoppel.
As a result, Shelton should only preclude the offensive use of ESC decisions in
subsequent civil litigation.
Suzanne M. Guitar
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EMPLOYER IMMUNITY FOR EMPLOYMENT
REFERENCES: MAYBE, MAYBE NOT
1. INTRODUCTION
In May of 1996 South Carolina joined a national trend' by enacting a statute
that purports to grant employers immunity for disclosing certain truthful information
concerning current or former employees to prospective employers.' Unfortunately,
1. Julie Forster, 25 StatesAdopt 'Good Faith'Job Reference Laws to ShieldBusinessesfrom
Liability, WEsT's LEGAL NEws 6402, July 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 363324. Since the
publication of the Forster article, a number of other states have enacted similar legislation. See, e.g.,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.12 (Supp. 1997) (providing immunity for civil liability for employers that
disclose information); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-02-18 (Supp. 1997) (providing employers with immunity
for employment references).
2. The employer immunity statute reads:
(A) As used in this section:
(1) "Employer" means any person, partnership, for profit or nonprofit
corporation, limited liability corporation, the State and its political subdivisions
and their agents that employ one or more employees. As used in this definition,
"agent" means any former supervisor or the employer's designee.
(2) "Employee" means any person employed by an employer.
(3) "Evaluation" means a written employee evaluation which was
conducted by the employer and signed by the employee, including any written
employee response to the evaluation, before the employee's separation from the

employer and ofwhich the employee, upon written request, shall be given acopy.
(4) "Former employee"means an individualwho was previously employed
by an employer.
(5) "Job performance" includes, but is not limited to, attendance, attitude,

awards, demotions, duties, effort, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promotions, and
disciplinary actions.
(6) "Prospective employer" means any employer to which a prospective
employee has made application, either oral or written, or forwarded a resume or
other correspondence expressing an interest in employment.
(7) "Prospective employee" means any person who has made an
application either oral or written or has sent a resume or other correspondence to
a prospective employer indicating an interest in employment.
(B) Unless otherwise provided bylaw, an employer shall be immune from civil
liability for the disclosure of an employee's or former employee's dates of

employment, pay level, and wage history to a prospective employer.
(C) Unless otherwise provided by law, an employer who responds in writing to
a written request concerning a current employee or former employee from a
prospective employer of that employee shall be immune from civil liability for
disclosure ofthe following information to which an employee or former employee
may have access:
(1) written employee evaluations;
(2) official personnel notices that formally record the reasons for
separation;

(3) whether the employee was voluntarily or involuntarily released from

1171
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the statute provides employers little real protection. The statute's alleged "safe
harbor" only allows employers to disclose, both orally and in writing, employment
dates, pay level, and wage history To disclose additional information, employers
must respond in writing to a prospective employer's written request for
information.4 However, according to common-law defamation principles, employers
were free to divulge this information prior to the statute's enactment.' Thus, the
statute pays little more than lip service to "employer immunity." Indeed, if a court
finds that the South Carolina General Assembly intended that the statute supplant
common-law defamation principles, the statute may even abrogate employer rights
by limiting the content of protected references.
This Note examines the reasons for the statute's adoption and its terms for
providing immunity. After an overview of South Carolina defamation law, this Note
explores the interaction between the employer immunity statute and common-law
defamation principles. This Note concludes with recommendations to the General
Assembly for improving the effectiveness of the statute.
II. BACKGROUND

Employers across the nation have increasingly adopted "no comment" policies
in response to requests for employment references.6 Their failure to provide
employment references is largely due to a fear that employees receiving negative
references will subsequently sue for defamation.7 Historically, employees have also
brought suit under theories of intentional interference with contract,8 intentional
misrepresentation,9 or retaliation under Title VII.O Some states have even allowed

service and the reason for the separation; and
(4) information about job performance.
(D) This protection and immunity shall not apply where an employer knowingly
or recklessly releases or discloses false information.
S.C. CoDEANN. § 41-1-65 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
3. Id. § 41-1-65(B). Pure factual information, such as employment dates, pay level, and wage
history, is probably incapable of imparting defamatory meaning.
4. Id. § 41-1-65(C).
5. See generally Thomas R. Haggard & William H. Eoyd, III, Workplace Defamation, S.C.
LAW., Sept/Oct. 1991, at 10, 11-13 (explaining that an employer can be liable fordefamation only after

a plaintiff establishes that the communication was defamatory and caused the plaintiff's damage).

6. See Bradley Saxton, Flaws in the Laws Governing Employment References: Problemsof
"Overdeterrene"andaProposalfor
Reform, 13 YALEL. &PoL'YREV. 45,46-49 (1995); see also

Forster, supranote 1 (citing Michael Fields, South Carolina's state director for the National Federation

of Independent Businesses (NFIB), who stated that employers were receiving inadequate employment
information when seeldng employment references and that passing employer immunity legislation was
identified as a priority across the country for the NFIB).
7. Forster, supra note 1.

8. See Prescott v. Farmers Tel. Coop., 328 S.C. 379, 394-95, 491 S.E.2d 698, 706 (Ct. App.
1997).
9. See McNiemey v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 853 (D. Md. 1995).
10. See Causey v. Balog, 929 F. Supp. 900 (D. Md. 1996).
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employees to sue for defamation under the doctrine of self-publication" or the tort
of negligent hiring. 2 However, defamation is currently the most prevalent and
successful cause of action for plaintiffs that are dissatisfied with their employment
references. 3 According to a 1988 survey, one-third of all defamation cases were
brought by employees that allegedly received defamatory job references.' 4 Because
of the importance of defamation law in the context of employment references, this
Note will focus specifically on the interplay between South Carolina's employer
immunity statute and common-law defamation.
Accordingto arecent employment survey, employer reference checking is more
important than ever.'5 In a national survey, forty-four percent of respondents said
that a company's refusal to comment on an employee's performance adversely
affected the employee's opportunity to gain employment.'6 Nevertheless, despite the
importance placed on employment references, many employers have adopted strict
"no comment" policies. 7 Thus, while employment references have risen in
importance, the number of employers willing to provide these references has
decreased.'" In response to employer concerns, the Society for Human Resource

11. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876,888 (Minn. 1986) ("The
trend ofmodern authority persuades us that Minnesota law should recognize the doctrine of compelled
self-publication."). Under the doctrine of compelled self-publication, an employer can be held liable
when the employer knows that a defamed employee will be compelled to repeat a defamatory statement
to a prospective employer. Id. at 886. But see Carson v. Southern Ry. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1104, 1113-14
(D.S.C. 1979) (finding no publication when the employee repeated an allegedly defamatory statement
to co-workers even though the employer could have reasonably foreseen that the statement would be
repeated by the employee).
12. See Robert S.Adler & Ellen R. Peirce, EncouragingEmployers to Abandon Their "No
Comment" PoliciesRegardingJob References: A Reform Proposal,53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 1381,

1418 (1996). Negligent hiring occurs when an employer hires an employee with dangerous tendencies
that "the employer could have discovered upon reasonable investigation, but did not." Id. Although
negligent hiring is not recognized in South Carolina, this tort continues to grow in popularity and should
genuinely concern employers.
13.Note, ReferencesAvailable Upon Request... NotI!-EmployersAre Being SuedforProviding
Employee Job References, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 755, 756 (1994).
14. James W. Fenton, Jr. & Kay W. Lawrimore, EmploymentReference Checking,FirmSize, and
Defamation Liability, 30 J. SMALL Bus. MGMT.88, 88 (1992).

15. Adler & Peirce, supra note 12, at 1387.
16. Saxton, supra note 6, at 50. The survey posed the following question and received the
following answers: "Is a company's refusal to comment on an employee's performance a detriment
to his or her chances of getting ajob? Responses: No 51%; Yes 44%; Don't Know 5%."
Id. at 50 n.18.
17. See Adler & Peirce, supra note 12, at 1386; see also Alex B. Long, Note, Addressingthe
Cloud Over Employee References: A Survey ofRecently EnactedState Legislation,39 WM. &MARY

L. REV. 177 (1997) (proposing a model statute that would require employers to reveal information
about employees under certain circumstances). The author notes that "[b]y disclosing negative
information, employers potentially expose themselves to defamation claims. By intentionally failing
to include negative information, employers face possible negligent referral claims. These rulings have
helped to create a 'damned if you do, damned if you don't' fear among employers that discourages the
exchange of references." Id. at 188 (footnotes omitted).
18. Adler & Peirce, supra note 12, at 1386-87.
Published by Scholar Commons, 1998

23

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 5 [1998], Art. 9
1174

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:1171

Management began a national campaign encouraging states to adopt some form of
employment immunity statute for employers that provide "good faith" job
references. 9 Prior to 1995, only five states had enacted some form of employer

immunity statute.2" Now, over half of the states, including South Carolina, have
enacted employer immunity statutes.2 '
III. THE SOUTH CAROLINA STATUTE
The South Carolina employer immunity statute appears to have been enacted
to eliminate some of the risks employers face when providing employment
references.' The statute is based on the premise that information is an important
aspect of the employment decision. Because a "no comment" policy restricts the
flow of information and limits an employer's ability to make a responsible hiring
decision, the employer immunity statute attempts to provide a safe harbor for
employers disclosing information concerning current or former employees.
' the statute provides employers24 civil immunity
In subsection (B)
for
disclosing the following information about a current or former employee: (1) dates
of employment, (2) pay level, and (3) wage history.' This limited immunity26
extends to written or oral communications. The safe harbor provided by subsection
(C) encompasses a broader range of information than does subsection (B). 28 Also,
the immunity in subsection (C) is limited to written responses for written requests.29
Employers that comply with the statutory terms are immune from civil liability,
unless otherwise provided by law." Under subsection (C), employers can disclose
information that includes the following: "(1) written employee evaluations; (2)
official personnel notices that formally record the reasons for separation; (3)
whether the employee was voluntarily or involuntarily released from service and the
reason for the separation; and (4) information about job performance." 3' The safe

19. Forster, supra note I.
20. Id. These states were Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, and Georgia. Id.
21. Id.

22. The caption to the Senate version of the employer immunity statute purported that the statute
was "to grant employers immunity, both absolute and qualified depending on the scope of the
information, for responding to prospective employers' requests for references." S. 1041, 11 th Gen.
Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1996).
23. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
24. The statute defines "employers." Id,§ 41-1-65(A)(1).

25. Id. § 41-1-65(B).
26. According to subsection (D), the statute does not provide immunity to an employer who
"knowingly or recklessly releases or discloses false information." Id. § 41-1-65(D).
27. Subsection (C), however, provides immunity only for certain written requests and written
responses. Id. § 41-1-65(C).
28. Id.
29. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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harbor provisions of subsection (C) apply only to "information to which an
employee or former employee may have access."32 As a result, the safe harbor will
usually only apply to documented information and not to oral communications.
Although an employee may theoretically have "access" to oral information
regarding job performance, the receipt of this information may be difficult to prove
unless the employer relayed this information to the employee in someone else's
presence. Moreover, if the information communicated to the employee is negative,
the presence of another party may itself provide grounds for a defamation suit.
Both subsections (B) and (C) are prefaced by the phrase "[u]nless otherwise
' The intent of the General Assembly is not entirely clear. Does
provided by law."33
the phrase encompass federal law? Other statutory law? South Carolina common
law? The language implies that mere compliance with the statute's terms does not
necessarily insulate an employer from liability. The language especially raises a
problem with regard to South Carolina common law. For eXample, according to the
statute, an employer cannot take advantage of the safe harbor when the employer
"knowingly or recklessly releases or discloses false information."34 Thus, an
employer who acts knowingly or recklessly may be subjectto liability for disclosing
false information, regardless of compliance with the requirements set out in
subsections (B) and (C). According to Rogers v. FlorencePrintingCo.,"
The test by which a tort is to be characterized as reckless, willful or wanton
is whether it has been committed in such a manner or under such
circumstances that a person of ordinary reason or prudence would then
have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiffs rights.36
This broad common-law definition may encompass situations in which a
defendant's communication exceeded its scope,37 or when a defendant acted with
actual malice.3" Thus, at common law, an employer may be held liable for
maliciously revealing information that the employer believes is true if the
publication exceeds its scope.39 Arguably, an employer who acts with malice and

32. Id.

33. Id. § 41-1-6503) to (C).
34. Id. § 41-1-65(D).
35. 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958).

36. Id. at 577, 106 S.E.2d at 263.
37. See Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Prods., Inc., 316 S.C. 86, 89, 447 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1994)
("The publisher must not wander beyond the scope of the occasion."); Conwell v. Spur Oil Co., 240
S.C. 170, 179, 125 S.E.2d 270, 275 (1962) (noting that a qualified privilege may be defeated by the
manner of its exercise, even when the publisher believes that the communication is true); Fulton v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S.C. 287, 297, 67 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1951) (opining that the privilege
is destroyed when the communication "goes beyond what the occasion demands").
38. See Constant,316 S.C. at 89, 447 S.E.2d at 196 ("One publishing under a qualified privilege
is liable upon the proof of actual malice.").
39. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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yet complies with the terms of the statute could still be liable, given the "unless
otherwise provided by law" language. At common law, employees may have a
cause of action for defamation when an employer maliciously reveals true
information, whereas the statute only abrogates false communications. Thus, the
statute may provide employers greater immunity than that available at common law.
Undoubtedly, allegedly wronged employees will claim that common law should
supersede when the employer would be liable but for the statutory immunity.
Although this argument is logical given the "unless otherwise provided by law"
language, it is inconsistent with the policy behind the statute's passage; the statute
was enacted to provide employers with a safe harbor when providing employment
references.
IV. COMMON-LAW DEFAMATION
A. Definition
Common-law defamation is defined as a false communication with a
defamatory meaning, published with actual or implied malice, by the defendant,
concerning the plaintiff, and resulting in general or special damages.4 A defamatory
communication may be expressed either orally or in writing.4 A communication is

defamatory if it tends
"to impeach the honesty or integrity or reputation, or publish the natural or
alleged defects, of one who is alive, and thereby to expose him to public
hatred, contempt, ridicule, or obloquy, or to cause him to be shunned or
'
avoided, or to injure him in his office, business, or occupation." 42
For a communication to be defamatory, it must be made with malice43 or exceed the
scope of its purpose. Malice may be either actual or implied." Malice is implied
when the communication is actionable per se.45 To show actual malice (common
law), a plaintiff must establish that the defendant acted "'with ill-will towards the
plaintiff, or that it acted recklessly or wantonly, meaning with conscious
indifference toward plaintiffs rights."'46

40. See generally F. PATRICK HUBBARD & ROBERT L. FELIX, THE Sotm CAROLINA LAW OF
TORTS 459-511 (2d. ed. 1997) (discussing common-law defamation).
41. Haggard & Floyd, supranote 5, at 11.
42. Smith v. Bradstreet Co., 63 S.C. 525, 530,41 S.E. 763, 764 (1902) (quoting State v. Brock,
61 S.C. 141, 151, 39 S.E. 359, 362 (1901)).
43. See HUBBARD & FELIX, supranote 40, at 466-468.
44. See id.
45. Cf. Haggard & Floyd, supra note 5, at 13.
46. Padgett v. Sun News, 278 S.C. 26,32,292 S.E.2d 30, 34 (1982) (quoting Rogers v. Florence
Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 577, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958)).
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B. Defenses
Several defenses are available to employers that find themselves defendants in
defamation actions. An employer can assert truth, employee consent, the First
Amendment, or an absolute or qualified privilege.47 Truth is an absolute defense to

a charge of defamation.48 The defendant, however, bears the difficult burden of
proving that an allegedly defamatory statement was substantially true.49 Because the

circumstances surrounding an allegedly defamatory message are usually in dispute,
it is difficult for an employer to show that the statements are actually true. Consent
is also an absolute defense-as long as it is voluntarily given.5" Unless the plaintiff
is a public official, public figure, or seeking to obtain punitive damages, First
Amendment constitutional protections rarely apply to cases involving employment
references."
In many employment cases, employers defend on the basis of qualified
privilege5 2 Qualified privilege should be distinguished from an absolute privilege.
If an employer enjoys an absolute privilege, then an action for defamation will fail
even if the communication was false and malicious. 3 "Within the employment
context, employers enjoy an absolute privilege in making statements before quasi-

judicial boards such as those addressing unemployment, workers' compensation,
and grievance disputes."54 However, this is a narrow class of communications and

issues of qualified privilege more often arise in the employment context because of
the doctrine's broader applicability.
South Carolina has not directly addressed the issue of qualified privilege and

47. See Haggard & Floyd, supranote 5, at 14-16 (discussing the defenses to defamation).
48. Parkerv. Evening Post Publ'g Co., 317 S.C. 236,245,452 S.E.2d 640,645 (Ct. App. 1994).

49. Id.
50. See Gathers v. Harris Teeter Supermarket, Inc., 282 S.C. 220,229,317 S.E.2d 748,754 (Ct.
App. 1984).
51. See Adler & Peirce, supranote 12, at 1405-07.
52. See Haggard & Floyd supranote 5, at 14-16. Section 595 of the Second Restatement of Torts
describes a qualified privilege in the following manner:
(1) An occasion makes a publication conditionally privileged if the circumstances
induce a correct or reasonable belief that
(a) there is information that affects a sufficiently important interest of the
recipient or a third person, and
(b) the recipient is one to whom the publisher is under a legal duty to publish
the defamatory matter or is a person to whom its publication is otherwise within
the generally accepted standards of decent conduct.
(2) In determining whether a publication is within generally accepted standards of
decent conduct it is an important factor that
(a) the publication is made in response to a request rather than volunteered
by the publisher or
(b) a family or other relationship exists between the parties.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 595 (1979).
53. Alder & Peirce, supranote 12, at 1404.
54. Id. at 1404-05.
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its application to employment references." However, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals has indicated that employers have a qualified privilege to publish
information when both parties have a legitimate interest in the communication. 6
"'The privilege arises from the necessity of full and unrestricted communication
concerning a matter in which the parties have an interest or duty ....,, A
communication, therefore, is subject to a qualified privilege if it is made "in good
faith on any subject matter in which the person communicating has an interest or
duty... [and is] made to a person with a corresponding interest or duty even though
it contains matter which, without this privilege, would be actionable."58 A qualified
privilege can be defeated by a showing of actual malice. 5 A qualified privilege can
also be defeated if it exceeds the scope of its purpose." Thus, both malice and scope
may operate to defeat a qualified privilege. However, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, created some confusion on this issue in Austin v. Torrington Co.6 ' In
Austin the plaintiffs attempted to show malice by establishing that their former
employer told a prospective employer that the former employer could not
recommend the plaintiffs for employment.62 The Fourth Circuit apparently agreed
with the district court that the employment relationship established a serious,
common interest between the parties and that a qualified privilege existed.63
Supposedly basing its decision on South Carolina law, the court held that a qualified
privilege could only be defeated upon a showing of malice, regardless of evidence
that the communication exceeded its scope.' The court opined that even if the
communication "went beyond a simple statement of non-recommendation for
employment," the plaintiffs still retained the burden of proving actual malice. 65 The
Fourth Circuit concluded that "given a qualified privilege, there must be proof of

55. Sarah B. Boucher, Job References: Title VII Joins Defamation as Employer Concern in
South Carolina,S.C. LAW., May/June 1997, at 32, 35,

56. Wright v. Sparrow, 298 S.C. 469, 474, 381 S.E.2d 503, 506 (Ct. App. 1989) ("There is a
basis for applying a qualified privilege to situations in which an employee's job performance is
properly evaluated.").
57. Bell v. Evening Post Publ'g Co., 318 S.C. 558, 561, 459 S.E.2d 315, 317 (Ct. App. 1995)
(quoting Prentiss v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 256 S.C. 141, 147, 181 S.E.2d 325, 327 (1971)).
58. Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Prods., Inc., 316 S.C. 86, 89, 447 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1994).
59. See id. ("One publishing under a qualified privilege is liable upon the proof of actual
malice."); Cullum v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 228 S.C. 384, 388, 90 S.E.2d 370, 372 (1955) ("A
communication ...qualifiedly privileged is not actionable ... unless malice in fact be shown.").
60. Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S.C. 287, 297, 67 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1951). A
communication exceeds its proper scope if it "goes beyond what the occasion demands [should be
published], and is unnecessarily defamatory."Id. at297, 67 S.E.2d at 429; see also Abofreka v. Alston
Tobacco Co., 288 S.C. 122, 126,341 S.E.2d 622,625 (1986) (opining that a qualified privilege is lost
if the disclosure exceeds the scope of its purpose).
61. 810 F.2d 416 (4th Cir. 1987).
62. Id. at419.
63. Id. at 423-24.
64. Id. at424-25.
65. Id. at 424.
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''
malice infact."
South Carolina courts have not directly addressed the holding in Austin.
However, South Carolina defamation law appears to draw on definitions of both
exessive scope and malice to determine if a qualified privilege has been defeated. 7
The South Carolina Supreme Court has concluded that "[t]he time, place, and other
circumstances of the preparation and publication of defamatory charges, as well as
the language of the publication itself,are admissible evidence to show that the false
charge was made with malice."68 In essence, the concept of scope has been folded
into the definition of malice. If a communication exceeds its proper scope, it often
follows that the publisher did so out of malice. As a result, whether a defendant acts
with actual malice or publishes a communication that exceeds its proper scope, the
qualified privilege will probably fail.69

V. DEFAMATION LAW AND THE EMPLOYER IMMUNITY STATUTE

The South Carolina employer immunity statute does not protect an employer
who "knowingly or recklessly releases or discloses false information.""' As a result,
the safe harbor provided by the statute is qualified, rather than absolute. Arguably,
however, this was not the intent of the General Assembly. The statute's original
caption purported to grant "employers immunity, both absolute and qualified
depending on the scope of the information, for responding to prospective
employers' requests for references."" In a proposed draft of the employer immunity
statute, employers were granted absolute immunity for disclosing an employee's
dates of employment, pay level, job description, and wage history as well as for
disclosing certain written information. 2 However, subsections (B) and (C), as
enacted, both seem subject to a qualified privilege, given the limitations set forth in
subsection (D). Arguably, the language in subsection (D) refers to actual malice and
not scope because the common-law definition of actual malice is substantially
similar to the language in the employer immunity statute in subsection (D)."

66. Id. at 425. In essence, the court held that althoughthe communication exceeded its scope, a
qualified privilege could only be defeated upon a showing of actual malice as well. See id.
67. See Constant v. Spartanburg Steel Prods., Inc., 316 S.C. 86, 89, 447 S.E.2d 194, 196 (1994)
(reasoning that an employer's qualified privilege can be defeated by a showing of malice and that
malice may be established by proving that the employer acted recklessly and with conscious disregard
for the employee's rights); see also Moshtaghi v. Citadel, 314 S.C. 316, 324, 443 S.E.2d 915, 920 (Ct.
App. 1994) ("The employer-employee privilege does not protect unnecessary defamation.").
68. Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 220 S.C. 287,296, 67 S.E.2d 425, 429 (1951).
69. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(D) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
71. S. 1041, 111th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (S.C. 1996).
72. Id. ("[Ain employer who discloses information about a current or former employee to a
prospective employer of the employee shall be absolutely immune from civil liability. The immunity
applies only to disclosure of the following: (1) date of employment; (2) pay level; (3)job description
and duties, and (4) wage history.").
73. Compare Padgett v. Sun News, 278 S.C. 26, 32, 292 S.E.2d 30,34 (1982) ("Actual malice
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Ifthe statutory language in subsection (D)only refers to malice, not scope, then
the statute may provide employers more protection than that available at common
law. Furthermore, the terms set out in subsections (B) and (C) are prefaced by the
words "[u]nless otherwise provided by law."'74 Should a court determine that
common-law defamation principles are incorporated by that phrase, then any
additional protection granted to employers by the statute could be undercut because
common-law causes of action would still be available. On the other hand, should
a court hold that when employers abide by the statute's terms the statute supplants
common law, employees' recourse to common-law would be barred. Thus, the

statute could provide employers more protection than previously available.
However, because the scope of the communication protected by statute is limited
in content and form and is only publishable to prospective employers, the
communications sanctioned by the statute would probably be subject to a qualified
privilege at common law anyway. As a result, any additional protection granted by
the statute, with reference to the scope of the communication, could be largely
illusory.
Although unlikely, a court might interpret the statute as completely supplanting
common-law defamation principles in the context of employment references. As a
result, the most important question raised by the employer immunity statute is
whether the statute is intended to supplant the common law. Unlike a number of
other state statutes providing employer immunity,75 the South Carolina employer
immunity statute does not clearly state whether it supplants all relevant common
law.76 Perhaps the statute should be interpreted as supplanting the common law only
when an employer complies with its terms; however, when an employer fails to
comply with the statutory terms, common-law principles of defamation and
privilege should continue to apply. If the employer immunity statute is interpreted
as entirely supplanting the common law, employers may continue to implement and
follow "no comment" policies because of the statute's cumbersome restrictions77
and the limited value of the information employers are able to provide in a
reasonable amount of time. Such a result would be directly at odds with the intent
of the statute to provide employers "immunity from liability for disclosure of
information." ' Statutes should be read so that they comport with the legislature's

means that [the defendant] acted 'with ill-will towards the plaintiff, or that [the defendant] acted
recklessly or wantonly, meaning with conscious indifference toward plaintiff's rights."' (quoting
Rogers v. Florence Printing Co., 233 S.C. 567, 577, 106 S.E.2d 258, 263 (1958))), with S.C. CODE
ANN. § 41-1-65(D) ("This protection and immunity shall not apply where an employer knowingly or
recklessly releases or discloses false information.").
74. S.C. CoDEANN. § 41-1-65(B) to (C) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
75. See infratext accompanying note 83.
76. The statute uses the ambiguous phrase "unless otherwise provided by law." See supra text
accompanying notes 33-39.
77. See supratext accompanying notes 23-32.
78. S.C. CODEANN. § 41-1-65 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997). But see S.C. CODEANN. § 2-13-175
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997) (mandating thatheadings or captions used to introduce code sections cannot
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intent.79 Specifically, "[t]he policy and purpose of the entire Act have to be
considered and... the real purpose and intent of the lawmakers will prevail over
the literal import of the words."8 Additionally, South Carolina law provides that
"statutes in derogation ofcommon law rights are strictly construed and not extended
in application thereof beyond the clear legislative intent."'" Section 41-1-65 may
limit the common-law qualified privilege afforded to employers that provide
employment references in good faith by narrowly confining employer immunity to
the terms of subsections (B) and (C). As a result, the employer immunity statute
should be strictly construed so that it does not supplant common-law principles
unless an employer takes advantage of the safe harbor provided by the statute's
terms. This reading of the statute would allow employers to take advantage of
common-law defenses when they do not come within the coverage ofthe employer
immunity statute.
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

The South Carolina employer immunity statute seemingly provides a safe
harbor for employers that abide by its terms. Unfortunately, the statute's
relationship to common-law defamation is unclear. The statute may be interpreted
as actually providing less protection than that available at common law and, at most,
providing immunity equal to that of the common law. Moreover, compliance with
the terms ofthe statute is both time-consuming and largely ineffective in providing
prospective employers with timely and informative employment references.
Specifically, employers generally fill immediate hiring needs, and written requests
for information take longer to process than oral requests. The statute, however, only
provides conditional immunity for limited oral disclosures-dates of employment
and wage information. Consequently, employers that provide substantive
information about an employee's job performance over the phone, or in person, are
not protected by the statute. Prospective employers that need more information than
is available under subsection (B), must comply with the written request mandates
of subsection (C).
The employer immunity statute could be improved in two respects. First, the
language "unless otherwise provided by law" should be clarified. For example,
Maine's employer immunity statute specifically provides that it "is supplemental to
and not in derogation of any claims available to the former employee that exist
under state law and any protections that are already afforded employers under state
law." 2 Thus, unlike the South Carolina employer immunity statute, Maine's statute
specifically sets forth how it relates to other state laws. Second, South Carolina's
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employer immunity statute should grant absolute, rather than qualified, immunity
for the proper disclosure of information as defined in subsections (B) and (C). 83
Absolute immunity would provide employers with a true safe harbor as opposed to
merely providing employers with a qualified privilege-a privilege already afforded
by common law. Instead, a qualified privilege should only apply when employers
step outside the statutory safe harbor. In this manner, the statute would provide a
truly safe harbor for employers that comply with its terms and still keep intact
common-law defamation principles to regulate employer liability when the
employer exceeds the statutory terms for immunity.
SandiR. Wilson

83. Some state statutes currently provide absolute immunity for certain disclosures. See, e.g.,
§ 44-119a (Supp. 1996) (providing absolute immunity for disclosures about dates of
employment, wages, job descriptions, duties, wage histories, written evaluations, and whether an
employee was fired and why).
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